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Abstract How can an incomplete and uncertain model of the environment be used
to perceive, infer, decide and act efficiently? This is the challenge that both living
and artificial cognitive systems have to face. Symbolic logic is, by its nature, unable
to deal with this question. The subjectivist approach to probability is an extension to
logic that is designed specifically to face this challenge. In this paper, we review a
number of frequently encountered cognitive issues and cast them into a common
Bayesian formalism. The concepts we review are ambiguities, fusion, multimo-
dality, conflicts, modularity, hierarchies and loops. First, each of these concepts is
introduced briefly using some examples from the neuroscience, psychophysics or
robotics literature. Then, the concept is formalized using a template Bayesian
model. The assumptions and common features of these models, as well as their
major differences, are outlined and discussed.
1 Introduction
It is remarkable that a wide variety of common cognitive issues—in the sense that
they appear frequently—can be tackled by so small a set of common models—in the
sense that these models are shared by these issues. In other words, a few template
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mathematical constructs, based only on probabilities and Bayes’ rule, can be applied
to a large assortment of problems that have to be addressed by cognitive systems.
Our purpose, in this paper, is to demonstrate these assertions by proposing a step-
by-step inspection of these cognitive problems and, for each of them, by describing
a candidate Bayesian model. The cognitive issues we cover are ambiguities, fusion,
multimodality, conflicts, modularity, hierarchies and loops. Of course, each of these
is a large topic, covering several research domains, from neuroscience and
experimental psychology to modeling and robotics. Each of these regularly warrant
full scale reviews of the relevant literature. We of course do not presume to cover
such an extensive body of work here; instead, we only reference a few key papers as
illustrations for each model. This larger perspective allows, we believe, to better
grasp the big picture: it will appear that these issues and associated models are
solved by a graduation of very similar models, each only marginally more complex
than the previous.
1.1 Probability As an Extension to Logic
Both living creatures and artificial cognitive systems have to face the same
fundamental difficulty; that is, how to use an incomplete and uncertain model of
their environment to perceive, infer, decide and act efficiently.
Indeed, any model of a real phenomenon is incomplete. Hidden variables, not
taken into account in the model, influence the phenomenon. The effect of these
hidden variables is that the model and the phenomenon never behave exactly alike.
Uncertainty is the direct and unavoidable consequence of incompleteness. No model
can foresee exactly the future observations of a phenomenon, as these observations
are biased by the hidden variables. No model can also provide an exact prediction of
the consequences of its decisions.
Logic is the foundation paradigm for rational reasoning. As such, logic is the core
of mathematics, scientific methodology, computer science and technology, and is
possibly the only common denominator of the various current theories of brain and
cognition.
Nevertheless, by its very nature, symbolic logic cannot deal with incomplete and
uncertain information. Symbolic logic can only be used to manipulate knowledge
that is certain to be either true or false. Logical inference is impossible as soon as
part of the required information is missing.
Living organisms must make sensorimotor decisions with quite incomplete
knowledge of their environment. However, the creatures that we can observe
survive every day as individuals and have survived millions of years as species. This
single fact proves that adequate (even if not optimal) sensorimotor decisions can be
made with incompleteness and uncertainty.
1.2 The Subjectivist Approach to Probability
The subjectivist approach to probability proposes probability theory as an extension
to symbolic logic for rational reasoning in the presence of incompleteness and
uncertainty (Jaynes 2003). It is sometimes partially improperly called the ‘‘Bayesian
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approach’’: indeed, this now ubiquitous expression sometimes refers to different
notions in different scientific communities.
The subjectivist approach deals with incompleteness and uncertainty using a two-
step process, learning and inference (see Fig. 1).
Learning transforms irreducible incompleteness into quantified uncertainty (i.e.,
probability distributions). These distributions result from both preliminary knowl-
edge of the reasoning subject and experimental data obtained by observation of the
phenomenon.
Preliminary knowledge, even when it is imperfect and incomplete, is relevant and
provides interesting hints about the observed phenomenon. Preliminary knowledge
is not a fixed and rigid model purporting completeness. Rather, it is a gauge, with
free parameters, waiting to be moulded by experimental data.
Experimental data obtained from physical interaction with the environment
reflect all of the complexity of this interaction. This includes the effect of hidden
variables that are not taken into account by preliminary knowledge. Using the
experimental data, the learning process sets the values of the free parameters of the
preliminary knowledge. Thus, the influence of the hidden variables is taken into
account and quantified.
Inference is performed using the probability distributions obtained in the first step
of the procedure.
To do so, we only require the two basic rules of Bayesian inference, the product
rule1 (Eq. 1) and the marginalization or sum rule (Eq. 2).
PðX1X2Þ ¼ PðX1ÞPðX2jX1Þ ¼ PðX2ÞPðX1jX2Þ ð1Þ
PðX1Þ ¼
X
X2
PðX1X2Þ ð2Þ
These two rules are to Bayesian inference what the resolution principle is to
logical reasoning (Robinson 1979). They are sufficient to perform any inference on
discrete probability distributions. These inferences may be as complex and subtle as
Fig. 1 The subjectivist
approach to incompleteness
1 From which we derive directly Bayes’ theorem, which, strictly speaking, reads P(X2 | X1) = P(X1|X2)
P(X2)/P(X1), provided P(X1) = 0. Most of the time though, both names and equations can be used
interchangeably.
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those achieved with logical inference tools. Indeed, it can be shown that logical
inference is a particular case of probabilistic inference (Jaynes 2003).
Learning itself can be described as a probabilistic inference problem in which the
values of the learned parameters are obtained by maximizing their probability based
on knowing both the preliminary knowledge and the data.
1.3 The Bayesian Programming Formalism
The necessary information for completely specifying a probabilistic model consists
of: (1) the relevant variables, (2) the conditional dependencies between these
variables, (3) the parametric forms of the associated probability distributions, and
(4) their associated parameter values.
The usual way of representing such models in the literature uses different
graphical forms (see Bayesian networks described by Pearl (1988) and Jensen
(1996), or graphical models as presented by Frey (1998) and Jordan (1999)). The
relevant variables are nodes, their conditional dependencies represented by vertices
between these nodes, and the parametric forms associated with each node.
As probability is an extension to symbolic logic, it is also possible to use an
algebraic formalism to define probabilistic models. We proposed such a formalism
called Bayesian Programming (Bessie`re et al. 2003; Lebeltel et al. 2004; Bessie`re
et al. 2008).
A Bayesian program (BP) contains two parts:
• a description that is the probabilistic model of the studied phenomenon or the
programmed behaviour; and
• a question that specifies an inference problem to be solved using this model.
A description contains two parts:
• a specification part that formalizes the modeler’s knowledge; and
• an identification part where free parameters are learned from experimental data.
Finally, the specification is constructed from three parts:
• a selection of relevant variables to model the phenomenon;
• a decomposition, whereby the joint distribution on the relevant variables is
expressed as a product of simpler distributions exploiting conditional indepen-
dence between variables; and
• the parametric forms in which either a given mathematical function or a
question for another BP is associated with each of the distributions appearing in
the decomposition.
In this paper, we focus mostly on the variables and the decomposition part of this
formalism, in which the joint probability distribution is specified as a product of
simpler distributions. We will omit the parametric forms and the distributions,
which are often problem dependent, in the sense that they are closely related to the
problem at hand (whether the system studied is sensory, motor, etc.).
For instance, if we have a model with three variables, M (the motor commands
for speech), G (the geometry of the articulatory apparatus) and F (the produced
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sound characterized by its formants), we can assume a conditional independence
between F and M when G is known. Indeed, knowledge of the shape of the vocal
tract provides sufficient information to compute the formants. The joint distribution,
P(M G F), is then decomposed as:
PðMGFÞ ¼ PðMÞPðGjMÞPðFjGÞ:
When the decomposition of a joint distribution is available, the answer to any
question you might want to ask of the model may be computed.
For instance, the answer to the question, P(M | F), which searches for the motor
commands to produce a given sound, is computed as:
PðMjFÞ ¼ PðMFÞ
PðFÞ ð3Þ
¼
P
G PðMGFÞP
G;F PðMGFÞ
ð4Þ
¼
P
G PðMÞPðGjMÞPðFjGÞP
G;F PðMÞPðGjMÞPðFjGÞ
ð5Þ
PðMjFÞ ¼ 1
Z
X
G
PðMÞPðGjMÞPðFjGÞ ð6Þ
where Eq. 3 is obtained by the application of Bayes’ rule, Eq. 4 is obtained by the
marginalization rule applied to both the numerator and the denominator, Eq. 5 is
obtained by replacing the joint distribution by its decomposition and, finally, Eq. 6
is obtained by noticing that the denominator is a normalization constant independent
of M.
After this short introduction to the formalism, in order to advance our knowledge
about the relevance of the subjectivist probabilistic approach to modeling and
building either living or artificial cognitive systems, we review, in the sequel, a
number of concepts common to cognitive systems, such as ambiguities, fusion,
multimodality, conflicts, modularity, hierarchies and loops.
First, each of these concepts is introduced briefly and illustrated by examples
from the literature in neuroscience, psychophysics or robotics. Finally, we present a
template Bayesian model to account for these concepts, emphasizing their most
prominent assumptions.
2 Ambiguities
Natural cognitive systems are immersed in rich and widely variable environments. It
would be difficult to assume that such systems apprehend their environments in all
their details, all the time, if only because of limited sensory or memory capacities.
As a consequence, relations between the characteristics of external phenomena and
internal states cannot always be bijections. In other words, internal states will
sometimes be ambiguous with respect to external situations.
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2.1 Inverse Problem
Description: A problem is said to be inverse when we know a direct (or forward)
relation and we seek the reverse relation. The inversion of a deterministic function,
which often does not have a closed-form solution, can be very difficult.
Example: Sensation is commonly defined as the effect of some phenomenon on the
senses. Perception involves recovering information about the phenomenon, given the
sensation. Perception is an inverse problem (Poggio 1984; Yuille and Bu¨lthoff 1996;
Pizlo 2001). Indeed, it is often easy to predict the sensations corresponding to a
particular phenomenon (see Sect. 3). In this case, the direct function yields the
sensation given the phenomenon, whereas perception is the inverse problem of
extracting the phenomenon given the sensation. For example, when we know the shape
of an object, basic geometry allows us to derive its projection on the retina. Conversely,
it is difficult to reconstruct the shape of an object given only its projection on the retina.
Model: In the Bayesian framework, an inverse problem is addressed using the
symmetry of Bayes’ rule. In a generic example of perception, let U be a variable
representing some characteristics of the phenomenon and let S be a variable
representing the sensation. The joint probability distribution is typically factored as:
PðUSÞ ¼ PðUÞPðSjUÞ: ð7Þ
In this expression, PðUÞ is a prior on the phenomenon; that is, the expectation about
the phenomenon before any observation has occurred. PðSjUÞ is the probability
distribution over sensations, given the phenomenon, which is also known as the
likelihood of the phenomenon (when considered not as a probability distribution but
as a function of U); it is the direct model.
The probabilistic question of perception is PðUjSÞ, the probability distribution on
the phenomenon, based on a given sensation. This question, which is the posterior
distribution on the phenomenon after some observation, is solved by Bayesian
inference:
PðUjSÞ ¼ PðUSÞ
PðSÞ ð8Þ
¼ PðUSÞP
U PðUSÞ
ð9Þ
PðUjSÞ ¼ PðUÞPðSjUÞP
U PðUÞPðSjUÞ
: ð10Þ
Equation 8 is the application of Bayes’ rule, and Eq. 9 is the application of the
marginalization rule. In Eq. 10, the joint distribution is replaced by its decompo-
sition (Eq. 7). This expression can be computed because it only involves the prior
and the likelihood functions, which are specified in the decomposition.
2.2 Ill-Posed Problem
Description: A problem is said to be well posed when it admits a unique solution.
Conversely, an ill-posed problem admits either many solutions or no solution at all.
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In most of the non-trivial inverse problems, the direct functions are not injective.
Therefore, the inverse relation is not properly a function. When the direct function is
not injective, the inverse problem is ill-posed.
Example: Perception is often an ill-posed problem. One illustrative example is
the well-known Necker cube, in which a wire-frame 2-D drawing of a cube is often
perceived as a cube in one of two possible positions (even if it can actually
correspond to the projection of an infinite number of 3-D structures).
There are many other examples of ill-posed perception, including recovering the
shape of an object from lighting or motion. Such examples have led to the
development of Bayesian models of perception, which are reviewed in the book by
Knill and Richards (1996) and in the article by Kersten et al. (2004). It has also been
argued that illusions arise when ill-posed problems are solved by choosing a
solution that does not correspond to the reality of the percept (an example can be
found in Geisler and Kersten (2002)).
In robotics, a common instance of an ill-posed problem is perceptual aliasing,
which occurs in robot localization when two different locations in an environment
produce identical sensor readings (Kuipers 2000; Thrun 2000).
In speech recognition or generation, recovering the seven-dimensional shape of
the vocal tract (Maeda 1990) from the first four dimensions (formants) of the
acoustic signal alone would be another example of an ill-posed problem. More
generally, the control of any redundant motor system (i.e., one with more degrees of
freedom than the dimension of the space to be accessed) is an ill-posed problem.
Model: In the Bayesian framework, the focus is not on finding a solution
matching all the constraints of the problem. Instead, a probability distribution is
computed. The analogy of a well-posed problem is a distribution with exactly one
mode. An ill-posed problem will typically yield a multimodal distribution, or a
distribution with a plateau.
The theoretical issue with inverse problems is that a direct function does not
always admit an inverse function. In the Bayesian framework, the probability
distribution can always be reversed, even if it is difficult to compute. Notice that the
property of an ill-posed problem is defined by the result of the inference. On the
other hand, a problem is inverse by virtue of its structure. Therefore, an ill-posed
problem is not necessarily an inverse problem.
2.3 Discussion
An ambiguity is a difficulty in finding a unique interpretation for a given stimulus.
This often leads to multistable percepts, in which case, different interpretations can
be actually perceived in the same conditions. Perceptual reversals can be involved
when a transition occurs from one percept to another. Ambiguity often arises as a
consequence of an ill-posed, inverse problem.
However, an ambiguous likelihood for a given stimulus does not always induce
multiple percepts. Indeed, as Eq. 10 shows, the likelihood is multiplied by the prior,
which can filter out part of the solutions. An illusion can occur precisely when the
likelihood produces multiple interpretations and the prior rules out the correct one.
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3 Fusion, Multimodality, Conflicts
Natural cognitive systems are equipped with a variety of rich sensors: rich, as they
continuously provide several measurements about a given phenomenon (e.g.,
multiple cells in the retina), and various, as they can measure different
manifestations of the same phenomenon (e.g., both hearing and seeing a falling
object). The difficulty arises when several of these measurements are to be used
together to recover characteristics of the phenomenon. We argue that the concepts
of fusion, multimodality and conflict can generally be cast into the same model
structure. This model is structured around the conditional independency assumption.
We also present extensions of this model that alleviate this assumption, thus trading
model simplicity for expressiveness.
3.1 Fusion
Description: Often, there are multiple sources of information that can be exploited
for any given phenomenon. Fusion is the process of forming a single percept
starting from multiple sources of information.
Example: A common example of fusion in the study of perception is cue
combination (or intramodal fusion). For instance, Jacobs (1999) studied the
perception of the depth of a simulated rotated cylinder. The depth of the cylinder
can be perceived by the motion of the texture, the deformation of the texture, or
both. Weiss et al. (2002), who studied the perception of the motion of a rhombus,
proposed a model of fusion of the velocity estimates obtained from the edges that, in
particular, can account for an illusion in the perception of the motion of a flat
rhombus. Hillis et al. (2004) proposed a model for combining texture and disparity
cues for perceiving the slant of a plane. One last example is given by Drewing and
Ernst (2006), who modeled the perception of curvature from haptic feedback, using
both position and force information.
In engineering and robotics, fusion is a common tool that is involved in many
applications (e.g., sensor fusion, medical diagnosis and antispam filters).
Model: All these examples follow the classical model of naive Bayesian
fusion (sometimes called weak fusion). A variant of this model is the naive
Bayes’ classifier (Mitchell, 1997). This model relies on the assumption that each
piece of information is independent from the others, conditioned on knowledge
of the phenomenon. Each piece of information is related to the phenomenon
using an inverse model similar to that discussed in Sect. 2.1. For instance, once
the cause is known, the consequences follow independently. This very strong
hypothesis is far from always being satisfied. However, it often gives satisfactory
results.
With S1; . . .; SN representing the variables corresponding to the N pieces of
information that are to be part of the fusion, and U being the variable corresponding
to characteristics of interest in the phenomenon, the naive fusion model assumes the
following decomposition of the joint probability distribution:
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PðUS1; . . .; SNÞ ¼ PðUÞ
YN
i¼1
PðSijUÞ: ð11Þ
This model can be used to compute the probability distribution on the phenomenon,
U, given all the sensations, S1; . . .; SN :
PðUjS1; . . .; SNÞ ¼ PðUÞ
QN
i¼1 PðSijUÞ
PðS1; . . .; SNÞ / PðUÞ
YN
i¼1
PðSijUÞ:
This model offers the advantage of being much simpler than a complete model
without any independence, as the joint is written as a product of low dimensional
factors. The size of a complete joint probability distribution is exponential in the
number of variables, whereas it is only linear when assuming naive fusion.
Furthermore, the use of many information sources generally allows for an
increase in the signal. For example, in the case of Gaussian uncertainty for the
sensor models, PðSijUÞ, and the prior, PðUÞ, the uncertainty of the posterior
distribution, PðUjS1; . . .; SNÞ, can be proven to be smaller with such a model than if
the pieces of information are not fused at all.
Note that some models rely on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). That is,
they do not compute the posterior probability distribution, PðUjS1; . . .; SNÞ, but
instead they are concerned with the likelihood of the phenomenon, PðS1; . . .; SN jUÞ.
For a given set of sensations, this is a function of U that reflects how well the
phenomenon explains the sensations. Thus, the MLE selects the phenomenon that
best matches the data.
Moreover, Bayes’ rule is written as: PðUjS1; . . .; SNÞ / PðUÞPðS1; . . .; SN jUÞ:
With a uniform prior, this states that the posterior is proportional to the likelihood.
Therefore, the MLE is tantamount to assuming a uniform prior or dismissing it
altogether.
3.2 Multimodality
Description: Fusion is often considered within a sensory modality, such as vision or
touch. However, it is often beneficial to consider multiple sources of information
from various sensory modalities when forming a percept in what is known as
multimodality.
Example: Bayesian modeling has often been used to study multimodal fusion.
For example, Anastasio et al. (2000) have proposed a model of multisensory
enhancement in the superior colliculus. Enhancement occurs when the neural
response to a stimulus in one modality is augmented by a stimulus in another
modality. In their work, they proposed a model of the probability of a target in the
colliculus with respect to the presence or absence of visual and auditory input.
Zupan et al. (2002) have proposed a model for visuo-vestibular interaction in which
they use a sensory weighing model, interpreted as an MLE. Gepshtein and Banks
(2003), who studied visuo-haptic integration, used a maximum likelihood model in
which the reliability of the visual cues is related to the projection. Ko¨rding and
Wolpert (2004a) performed experiments on sensorimotor learning. Using a
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Bayesian model of integration between visual feedback and proprioception, they
inferred and manipulated the prior distributions assumed for the participants in
their experiments. Ju¨rgens and Becker (2006) used Bayesian fusion for the
combination of vestibular, optokinetic, podokinesthetic, and cognitive informa-
tion for the perception of rotation. Finally, Haith et al. (2008) looks into
sensorymotor adaptation in a visually guided reaching experiment and proposes a
model that can also account for perceptual after-effects. This model predicts a
visual shift after adaptation of reaching in a force field, that has been confirmed
by an experiment.
Model: These models match the assumptions of the naive Bayesian fusion model
presented above. The main assumption is that the probability distribution over each
sensation is independent of the others given the phenomenon. Some of these models
use MLE, while others compute the complete posterior distribution.
Although the models are the same as those for intramodal fusion, they differ in
robustness. The conditional independence hypothesis is never totally valid. Part of
the uncertainty that exists between sensations may not be explained by U. These
additional correlations are more likely smaller between different modalities than
within the same modality, as different physical processes are involved. For example,
while fog or lack of illumination can jointly degrade different types of visual
information, such as colour or motion, hearing performance is not affected.
3.3 Conflicts
Description: When various sources of information are involved, each can sometimes
lead to significantly different individual percepts. In experiments, a conflict arises
when sensations from different modalities induce different behaviour compared
with when each modality is observed individually.
Introducing conflicts offers good experimental leverage for providing a lot of
information on the fusion process. For instance, the relative importance of different
cues can be assessed by observing the frequencies of behaviour corresponding to
each of the cues. Sometimes, the response to conflicting situations is mixed
behaviour that is also interesting to study when compared with that occurring in the
original situations.
Examples: To study the integration of visual and haptic information, Ernst and
Banks (2002) designed experiments in which the height of a bar had to be evaluated
either by simulated visual input, simulated tactile input or both. In this latter
condition, when different heights for both visual and haptic stimuli were simulated,
a maximum-likelihood model provided a good match to their data. Battaglia et al.
(2003) designed a localization task with conflicting visual and auditory input to
compare the classical visual capture model with a maximum likelihood model. They
argued for taking into account the observers’ perceptual biases. One special case of
this conflict is the ventriloquist effect (Alais and Burr 2004; Banks 2004).
Model: The models accounting for conflicts are still naive fusion and maximum
likelihood (with a naive fusion decomposition). Conflicts arise when the probability
distributions corresponding to each sensation are significantly different.
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The concept of a conflict is of a similar nature to that of an ill-posed problem.
Both are defined with respect to characteristics of the result. Conversely, inversion
and fusion are both structural properties of a problem and its associated model.
3.4 Less naive fusion
Description: Many models assume independence between the sensations condi-
tionally to knowledge of the phenomenon. This is sometimes too strong an
assumption. A model could assume no conditional independence between the cues.
This is sometimes called strong fusion, and leads to arbitrarily complex models that
are not tested easily. Less naive fusion models lie between strong fusion and naive
(or weak) fusion.
Example: For instance, Landy et al. (1995) introduced a modified weak fusion
framework. They tackled the cue combination problem in depth estimation and
argued for the addition of so-called ancillary cues. These cues do not provide direct
information on depth but help to assess the reliability of the various cues that appear
in the fusion process. Ancillary cues are the basis for a dynamic reweighting of the
depth cues.
Yuille and Bu¨lthoff (1996) propose the term strong coupling for non-naive
Bayesian fusion. They consider the examples of shape recovery from shading and
texture, and the coupling of binocular depth cues with monocular cues obtained
from motion parallax.
Models: Recall that the naive fusion model is based on the following
factorization of the joint probability distribution (Eq. 11):
PðUS1; . . .; SNÞ ¼ PðUÞ
YN
i¼1
PðSijUÞ:
The inclusion of ancillary cues can be achieved by the addition of a variable, A, to
represent them.2 Typically, the joint distribution is then factored as:
PðUAS1; . . .; SNÞ ¼ PðUÞPðAjUÞ
YN
i¼1
PðSijUAÞ:
We can still ask the same question of the phenomenon given the sensations:
PðUjS1; . . .; SNÞ / PðUÞ
X
A
PðAjUÞ
YN
i¼1
PðSijUAÞ
" #
ð12Þ
or we can know the value of the ancillary cue:
PðUjAS1; . . .; SNÞ / PðUÞPðAjUÞ
YN
i¼1
PðSijUAÞ: ð13Þ
This model is the same as a naive fusion model but with a phenomenon augmented
by the ancillary cues, U0 ¼ U ^ A. The only difference is in the questions asked, this
2 We note that Landy et al. (1995) did not find this type of Bayesian model to be useful.
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new model only being concerned with a part, U, of the global phenomenon, U0,
either with knowledge of ancillary cues, A, (this question is illustrated by Eq. 13) or
not (this question is illustrated by Eq. 12).
3.5 Discussion
Fusion is often seen as a product of models. It can be used when the underlying
models are defined independently so that they can be combined to form a shared
variable. Each model links this variable to distinct properties, and the fusion
operates on the conjunction (logical product) of these properties.
This idea of fusion as a product of independent models is also mirrored by the
inference process. Indeed, most of the time, the result of the fusion process is
proportional to the product of each individual result obtained by the underlying
models, PðUjS1; . . .; SnÞ /
QN
i¼1 PðUjSiÞ. However, this may not be the case,
depending on the exact specification of the underlying models. There are some more
complex fusion models that ensure that this inference product holds (Pradalier et al.
2003).
It is also interesting to note that, when all the probability distributions in the
product are Gaussian, the resulting probability distribution is also Gaussian. Its
mean is a weighted sum of the means of each Gaussian weighted according to a
function of their variance. Therefore, many weighted models proposed in the
literature can be interpreted as Bayesian fusion models with Gaussian uncertainty.
The weights also acquire the meaning of representing uncertainty, which can
sometimes be manipulated.
Finally, a conflict can only occur when it is assumed that a unique object is to be
perceived. When the discrepancy is too large, segmentation occurs leading to the
perception of separate objects (e.g., perception of transparency). Likewise, fusion is
a process of combining information from different sources for one object or feature.
Therefore, to account for segmentation, there is a need for more complex models.
Such models can deal with either one or multiple objects, as well as provide a
mechanism for deciding whether there is one or more objects. This theoretical issue
is called binding, unity assumption, or pairing (Sato et al. 2007), and has received
recent attention using hierarchical Bayesian models.
4 Modularity, Hierarchies
It would be difficult to assume that natural cognitive systems process their complex
sensory inputs in a single layer of computation. Therefore, computations can
probably be apprehended as processes that communicate intermediate results. This is
similar to the notion of modularity, which is central to structured computer
programming. A flow of computation can be broken down into structured sequences.
First, we present Bayesian models that amount to probabilistic versions of subroutine
calls and conditional switches. More complex constructs occur when parts of the
computations are based on observing other computation processes. By so doing, we
also describe Bayesian model recognition and Bayesian model abstraction.
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4.1 Subroutine
Description: Hierarchies rely on the notion of modularity, the simplest instance of
which is the subroutine; that is, the use of part of a model (submodel) within another
model. A model can be seen as a resource that can be exploited by other models.
Example: For example, Laskey and Mahoney (1997) propose the network
fragments framework, inspired by object-oriented software analysis and design to
define submodules of a global probabilistic model. They apply this tool to military
situation assessment, where a military analyst has to reason on various levels (basic
units, regiment, overall situation, etc.).
Koller and Pfeffer (1997) also propose object-oriented Bayesian networks as a
modeling language for Bayesian models based on an object-oriented framework.
Model: Here, we define the operation of calling a subroutine in terms of the
Bayesian programming framework. Let A and B be variables of interest for the
global model. We add an additional variable, P, to represent the possible models.
Let p1 be a value of P that represents the particular model to be written. When
defining p1, the model P is known; that is, the probability distributions are written
given P ¼ p1. For example:
PðABj½P ¼ p1Þ ¼ PðAj½P ¼ p1ÞPðBjA½P ¼ p1Þ:
A call to a subroutine can be performed simply by specifying that a distribution for
this model is the same as that for another model:
PðBjA½P ¼ p1Þ ¼ PðBjA½P ¼ p2Þ ð14Þ
where p2 is another model concerned with variables A and B. Equation 14 is an
assumption that the distribution over B given A in model p1 is the same as in p2.
Naturally, this requires model p2 to be specified. In this submodel, PðBjA½P ¼
p2Þ can be a factor in the decomposition of the joint probability distribution over all
the variables of model p2. In this case, the use of a submodel is not required.
However, most of the time, PðBjA½P ¼ p2Þ is the result of an inference in model
p2. As a Bayesian Program, p2 can be asked any probabilistic question related to its
variables and can be arbitrarily complex. Moreover, many different models can
question p2. In this sense, p2 can be considered as a resource.
4.2 Probabilistic Conditional Switches
Description: Mixture models are probability distributions with multiple compo-
nents. Such a model is generally a weighted sum of unimodal probability
distributions in order to yield a desired multimodal probability distribution.
Example: Mixture models are basic tools with which to build a model. They are
used as the parametric forms of probability distributions, along with uniform or
Gaussian distributions.
One common use of mixture models is in clustering and classification. A data set
is represented by a mixture of some basis distributions. The aim of clustering is to
learn the parameters of the mixture, whereas classification is usually interested in
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recovering the element of the mixture from which a particular observation
originates. Classical examples of mixture models are the Gaussian mixture models.
Mixture of experts is another type of mixture model. Initially, such models were
defined for neural networks (Jacobs et al. 1991). Waterhouse et al. (1996) proposed
a Bayesian learning algorithm for mixture models, the aim of which was to infer the
parameters of the mixture. Bishop and Svense´n (2003) proposed variational
methods of inference for mixture of experts models and applied their algorithm to
the prediction of the position of the end effector of a robotic arm.
Model: Mixture models are usually presented directly as weighted sums of
distributions:
PðAÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
wi  PiðAÞ ð15Þ
where N is the number of components, wi is the weight of each component, Pi(A),
and
PN
i¼1 wi ¼ 1.
Another way to present it involves introducing a variable, P, which can take
integer values between 1 and N. We can build the following decomposition:
PðAPÞ ¼ PðPÞPðAjPÞ
where PðAj½P ¼ piÞ ¼ PiðAÞ, with Pi(A) as defined above and Pð½P ¼ piÞ ¼ wi.
The probabilistic question corresponding to the mixture model is:
PðAÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
Pð½P ¼ piÞPðAj½P ¼ piÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
wi  PiðAÞ:
This definition of a mixture places the emphasis on variable P, which can be
considered as the index on the component Pi(A) to be chosen. It is hierarchical in the
sense that a collection of models, Pi(A), can be chosen using a variable external to
each of these models.
This mixture model can be generalized by a probabilistic conditional statement.
Let C be the variable representing the test condition. We can build the following
joint probability distribution:
PðAPCÞ ¼ PðCÞPðPjCÞPðAjPÞ
where P(C) is a prior on the condition (not used in the following question), PðPjCÞ
is the relative weighting among each of the models that depend on the condition,
and PðAjPÞ is a collection, Pi(A), of various models of A, possibly given condition
C.
The question can be written as:
PðAjCÞ ¼
X
P
PðPjCÞPðAjPÞ: ð16Þ
With Dirac distributions for PðPjCÞ, only one model, Pi(A), can be selected in the
expression 16, this question operating like a switch between the models. Otherwise,
this is a probabilistic generalization of a conditional statement; that is, the different
models are weighted according to the condition.
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4.3 Model Recognition
Description: The mixture model allows for a combination of different models into
one. Another issue that can be addressed using Bayesian modeling is model
recognition. In particular, when the class of models is a parameter space and
recognition is based on experimental data, this recognition amounts to a machine
learning problem.
Example: For example, Gopnik and Schulz (2004) studied the learning of causal
dependencies by young children. The experiments included trying to decide which
objects are ‘‘blickets’’ (imaginary objects that are supposed to illuminate a given
machine). Some objects are put on a machine that lights up depending on which
objects are placed on it. The patterns of response were predicted well by a causal
Bayesian network, even after adding some prior knowledge (‘‘blickets are rare’’).
The learning phase involved selecting the causal dependency structure that matches
the observations among all the possibilities.
Another example is the application of embedded Hidden Markov Models. These
are models in which a top-level Bayesian model reasons on nodes that are
themselves Bayesian models. Nefian and Hayes (1999) proposed such a formalism
in the context of face recognition. Each submodel is responsible for the recognition
of a particular feature of the face (forehead, eyes, nose, mouth and chin). The
global model ensures perception of the facial structure by recognizing each feature
in the correct order. Neal et al. (2003) applied embedded HMMs to the tracking of
3-D human motion from 2-D tracker images. The high dimensionality of the
problem proved to be less an issue for their algorithm than it was for the previous
approach.
Model: These models can be fit using the general framework of Bayesian model
recognition. Let D ¼ Dif g be the variables corresponding to the data used for
learning (Di, a variable for each datum), and let P be the variable corresponding to
the model. Generally, model recognition is performed using the following
decomposition:
PðPDÞ ¼ PðPÞPðDjPÞ
where PðPÞ is a prior on the various models and PðDjPÞ is the probability of
observations given the model (i.e., the likelihood of models).
Typically, the data are assumed to be independently and identically distributed
(the i.i.d. assumption); that is, PðDjPÞ ¼QNi¼1 PðDijPÞ, where PðDijPÞ does not
depend on index i of each datum. For each possible model, pj, the distribution,
PðDij½P ¼ pjÞ, is a call to the submodel, pj, as defined in Sect. 4.1.
The probabilistic question for model recognition is:
PðPjDÞ / PðPÞ
YN
i¼1
PðDijPÞ: ð17Þ
The expression 17 enables the computation of a probability distribution on the
various models based on some of the data. This mechanism is hierarchical in the
sense that we build a model for reasoning about an underlying set of models.
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Parameters: A common instance of model recognition is parameter learning. In
this case, the models, P, share a common parametric form, P0, and the recognition
occurs on the parameters, H: P ¼ H ^ P0. We can modify the decomposition
presented above by including knowledge of the parametric form:
PðHDjP0Þ ¼ PðHjP0ÞPðDjHP0Þ ¼ PðHjP0Þ
YN
i¼1
PðDijHP0Þ
where PðHjP0Þ is a prior distribution on the parameters and PðDjHP0Þ (or
PðDijHP0Þ with the i.i.d. assumption) is the likelihood of parameters.
So, learning can be accomplished using the following question:
PðHjDP0Þ / PðHjP0ÞPðDjHP0Þ / PðHjP0Þ
YN
i¼1
PðDijHP0Þ:
The likelihood functions are usually completely specified by the parametric form,
P0, and the parameters, H. However, the prior on the parameters, PðHjP0Þ, may
need some additional parameters called hyperparameters. The Bayesian formalism
allows for these hyperparameters in the same way. Let K be the variable repre-
senting these hyperparameters. We write the joint probability distribution as:
PðKHDjP0Þ ¼ PðKjP0ÞPðHjKP0ÞPðDjHP0Þ
where PðKjP0Þ is a prior on hyperparameters, PðHjKP0Þ is the distribution on
parameters, H, according to hyperparameters and PðDjHP0Þ is the likelihood
function, as above. As a result, inference on the parameters is modified slightly:
PðHjDP0Þ /
X
K
PðKjP0ÞPðHjKP0Þ½ PðDjHP0Þ:
The prior on the hyperparameters could also be parametric, and it is possible to add
another set of parameters. It all amounts to what knowledge the modeler wants to
include in the model. Moreover, it can be shown that deep layers of priors have
much less influence on parameter estimation.
Entropy principles: All the entropy principles (maximum entropy principle,
minimum relative entropy principle, Kullback–Leibler divergence) and their
numerous applications are closely and simply related to the above models.
Indeed, to take the simplest case of Eq. 17, if we consider that there are
K different possible observations (i.e., the variable Di can take K different values),
by gathering the same observations, we can restate this equation as:
PðPjDÞ / PðPÞ
YK
k¼1
Pð½Di ¼ kjPÞnk
where nk is the number of times that the observation, ½Di ¼ k, has been made. To a
first approximation, this number is proportional to the probability, Pð½Di ¼ kjPÞ,
itself and we obtain, with N the total number of observations:
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PðPjDÞ / PðPÞ
YK
k¼1
Pð½Di ¼ kjPÞNPð½Di¼kjPÞ ð18Þ
Finally, if we assume a uniform prior on the different models, and if we take the
logarithm of Eq. 18, we obtain the Maximum Entropy Principle:
log ðPðPjDÞÞ ¼ N
XK
k¼1
Pð½Di ¼ kjPÞ log ðPð½Di ¼ kjPÞÞ½  þ C:
4.4 Abstraction
Description: Usually, a modeler uses learning in order to select a unique model or
set of parameter values, which is then applied to the problem at hand. That is, the
learning process computes a probability distribution over models (or their
parameters) to be applied, and a decision, based on this probability distribution,
is used to select only one model or parameter set.
Another way to use model recognition is to include it as part of a higher-level
program in order to maintain the uncertainty on the models at the time of their
application. This is called model abstraction.
Example: Diard and Bessie`re (2008) used abstraction for robot localization. They
defined several Bayesian maps corresponding to various locations in the environ-
ment. Each map is a model of sensorimotor interactions with a part of the
environment. Then, they built an abstracted map based on these models. In this new
map, the location of the robot is defined in terms of the submap that best fits the
observations obtained from the robot’s sensors. The aim of their abstracted map was
to navigate in the environment. Therefore, they were more interested in the action to
be taken than in the actual location. However, the choice of an action was made with
respect to the uncertainty of the location.
A similar model was also recently applied to the domain of multimodal
perception, under the name of causal inference (Ko¨rding et al. 2007; Sato et al.
2007). When sensory cues are close, they could originate from a single source,
and the small spatial discrepancies could be explained away by noise; on the
other hand, when cues are largely separated, they more probably originate from
distinct sources, instead, and their spatial positions are not correlated. The
optimal strategy, when estimating the positions of these cues is then to have both
alternative models coexist and to integrate over the number of sources during the
final estimation.
Model: Let P be the variable representing the submodels, let D be the variable
representing the data and let X be the sought-after variable that depends on the
model. The joint probability distribution can be decomposed in the following way:
PðXDPÞ ¼ PðPÞPðDjPÞPðXjPÞ
where PðPÞ and PðDjPÞ are the priors and likelihood functions defined as before
and PðXjPÞ describes the influence of the model, P, on the variable of interest, X.
The question is concerned with the distribution over X given the data, D:
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PðXjDÞ ¼
X
P
PðPjDÞPðXjPÞ /
X
P
PðPÞPðDjPÞPðXjPÞ½ :
This inference is similar to model recognition except for the factor PðXjPÞ. With
respect to the question, PðXjDÞ, the details of the models can be abstracted.
When applied to classes of models and their parameters (i.e. when X is H), this
abstraction model yields the Bayesian Model Selection method (BMS). It can also
be used to jointly compute the distribution over joint models and parameters, using
PðPHjDÞ (Kemp and Tenenbaum 2008).
4.5 Discussion
Hierarchy is a means of controlling a given set of models by a higher-level model.
This model uses each lower-level model as a subroutine providing probabilistic
relations as a resource. One common example is behaviour choice. Several models
propose some type of behaviour depending on the partial knowledge that they need,
a higher-level model playing the role of an arbiter between them. There are two
common strategies considered for the arbiter, weighing and switching.
Weighing consists of mixing the various behaviours, usually by summation
according to some measure. In a Bayesian framework, this is exactly what is
achieved by mixture models (see Sect. 4.2 and in particular Eq. 15), in which each
individual model contributes to the result of the inference in proportion to its
probability. If the process evolves with time, the probability distribution over the
various behaviours can also evolve and, for example, allow for a smooth transition
between behaviours.
On the other hand, switching consists of choosing a behaviour, discarding the
others, and then applying that behaviour (Stocker and Simoncelli 2008). This can be
seen as the approximation of the summation in Eq. 15 by only one term. In this case,
the decision, which is also called an intermediate decision in the model, helps
reduce the complexity of the model by computing only one term instead of all the
subroutine calls in the submodels. Conversely, this is no longer an approximation if
the weights are zero for all except one submodel (a Dirac probability distribution).
In this case, a mixture model is a switching process.
Therefore, the Bayesian formulation unifies these two strategies into a common
hierarchical inference mechanism. Furthermore, the difference between weighing
and switching depends on the probability distribution over the models, switching if
it is a Dirac function (no uncertainty) and weighing otherwise. Therefore, for low
uncertainty, weighing and switching strategies cannot be distinguished.
5 Loops
It would be hard to assume that natural cognitive systems process their complex
sensory systems in a single direction, uniquely from sensory input toward motor
outputs. Indeed, neurophysiology highlights a variety of ways that neural system
activity can be fed back in loops. Models that include loops are mainly temporal in
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nature and deal with memory systems. Examples are mostly taken from models of
artificial systems, and especially from the robotics community.
5.1 Temporal Series of Observations
Description: In order to model the temporal behaviour of a phenomenon, it is
usually assumed that a sequential series of observations is available. These are
usually used for state estimation: recovering the evolution of some internal state that
is not observed.
Example: Kalman filters are the most common examples of models in this
category, probably because of strong assumptions that lead to a closed-form solution
for state estimation (Kalman 1960; Ghahramani et al. 1997). They are widely used
in robotics (Thrun et al. 2005) and in the life sciences (van der Kooij et al. 1999;
Kiemel et al. 2002). When the state space can be assumed to be discrete, Hidden
Markov Models can be applied (Rabiner 1989; Rabiner and Juang 1993). A
common technique for approximating the inference required for state estimation is
to model the state probability distribution using particle filters; this can also be seen
as the application of a mixture model to a loop model (Arulampalam et al. 2002).
More generally, these models are instances of Bayesian filters (Leonard et al. 1992;
Bessie`re et al. 2003). When the independence assumptions do not vary over time,
this class of models is called Dynamic Bayesian Networks (Dean and Kanazawa
1989; Murphy 2002). These models have also been extensively covered in the
statistics literature, sometimes using different vocabularies (Harvey 1992; Brock-
well and Davis 2000).
Model: Let O0:T denote a time series of observation variables from time 0 to T,
i.e., O0:T ¼ O0; O1; . . .; OT . Let S0:T represent the state variables over the same time
period. The global probabilistic model is defined by:
PðS0:T O0:TÞ ¼ PðS0O0Þ
YT
t¼1
PðStSt1OtÞ ð19Þ
PðS0:T O0:TÞ ¼ PðS0O0Þ
YT
t¼1
PðStjSt1ÞPðOtjStÞ: ð20Þ
Here, Eq. 19 results from the application of the Markov assumption: a given state
only depends on a number, n, of previous states, and not on those that occur
previously in the state history. In this case, n = 1 implies a first-order Markov
model. In other words, St-1 is assumed to be sufficient memory for the system.
Equation 20 states further that, for all t, the dependency structure between variables
is the same. This is the stationarity hypothesis.
In Eq. 20, P(St|St-1) is usually called the transition or dynamic model, and P(Ot|St)
is the observation model. When these models have the same form for all time steps,
t, the local model, P(St St-1 Ot) = P(St|St-1) P(Ot|St) P(St-1), is said to be time
invariant or homogeneous. In this case, the model can be seen to be an application of
the subroutine construct; that is, the global model, which deals with the complete
time sequence, is a result of the iteration of the local model.
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State estimation, which corresponds to the question, P(ST|O0:T), is solved by:
PðST jO0:TÞ /
X
ST1
PðST jST1ÞPðST1jO0:T1Þ:
By so doing, state estimation at time T, P(ST | O0:T), is computed recursively, based
on P(ST-1 | O0:T-1). In most practical implementations of this computation, the state
evaluation is recomputed each time a new observation is acquired using the past
state estimate as well as the prediction and observation models. In other words, state
estimation occurs in a loop over time.
The same model can be used to predict future states (prediction: P(St?k | O0:t),
k [ 0), or to refine some past estimate given observations that occur later in time
(filtering: P(St-k | O0:t), k [ 0). The larger the value of k, the more computationally
expensive these questions become, as the inferences require summations over k - 1
variables.
5.2 Efferent Copy
Description: Usually, in robotics and control contexts, the state of the observed
system can be not only observed but also acted upon. The previous models are
enriched with control variables as additional inputs for state estimation. ‘‘Reading’’
the values of these control variables after they have been decided, in order to
ameliorate state estimation or prediction, is one possible reason for there being
efferent copies of motor variables in animal central nervous systems.
Example: Input/output HMMs (Bengio and Frasconi 1995) have been introduced
in the machine learning literature and applied as benchmarks in grammatical
inference. In the robotic localization context, the Markov Localization model is the
most common example of this model category (Thrun et al. 2005).
In the life sciences, Laurens and Droulez (2007, 2008) applied Bayesian state
estimation using efferent copies to the modeling of 3-D head orientation in space in
humans and showed that such models could account for a variety of known
perceptual illusions.
Model: Let S0:T and O0:T, respectively, denote state and observation time series,
as previously, and let A0:T denote the control time series. The control variables are
usually used to refine the dynamic model into P(St | At-1 St-1):
PðS0:T O0:T A0:TÞ ¼ PðS0O0A0Þ
YT
t¼1
PðStjAt1St1ÞPðOtjStÞPðAtÞ:
5.3 Decision Theory
Description: The temporal loop models presented so far are usually used for state
estimation, whether this state is a past, current or future one. They can also be used
to compute probability distributions over future actions. For instance, this can allow
the choice of an action or a sequence of actions that are most likely to help progress
toward a given goal. The goal is usually not defined in probabilistic terms but with
the use of a deterministic function that describes those states and actions that are
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either beneficial or detrimental. This is called a reward, cost or loss function. The
process of computing future actions based on this function is known as decision
theoretic planning.
Example: A number of current models apply decision theory to robotic and
control planning. For instance, when the above Markov Localization model is
enriched with a reward function, it becomes a Partially Observable Markov
Decision Process (Kaelbling et al., 1998; Boutilier et al. 1999), which has been
widely applied in mobile robotics. If the internal state is not ‘‘hidden’’, in the sense
that it can be measured directly, the sensor model, P(Ot | St), is removed from the
dependency structure; the resulting formalism is a Markov Decision Process (Fully
Observable Markov Decision Process).
The issue of decision, that is, passing from a probability distribution to a value, is
actually not specific to loop models. For example, Ko¨rding and Wolpert (2004b)
apply Bayesian modeling to infer what loss function might be used by the central
nervous system in an open-loop motor control problem.
Model: The reward function, R, in its most general notation, associates states and
actions with a number that quantifies their interest or cost, R : St  At ! IR.
The reward function helps drive the planning process. Indeed, the aim of this
process is to find an optimal plan in the sense that it maximizes a certain measure
based on the reward function. This measure is most frequently the expected
discounted cumulative reward, hP1t¼0 ctRti, where c is a discount factor (less than
1), Rt is the reward obtained at time t and hi is the mathematical expectation3.
Given this measure, the goal of the planning process is to find an optimal mapping
from probability distributions over states to actions (a policy).
This planning process, which leads to intractable computations, is sometimes
approximated by iterative algorithms called policy iteration or value iteration.
These algorithms start with random policies and improve them at each step until
some numerical convergence criterion is met. Another approach is to try to
automatically find a hierarchical decomposition of the state space, so as to alleviate
the combinatorial explosion (Hauskrecht et al. 1998; Pineau and Thrun, 2002).
5.4 Action Selection
Description: Instead of trying to find a structural decomposition of the state space
automatically, alternative approaches can be pursued in order to reduce the
computational complexity of the planning and control processes. It is assumed that
the model already incorporates knowledge about the task or domain.
For instance, modeling cognitive systems requires including in the model
knowledge about the environment structure or task progression structure, so as to
separate elementary filters, and to reduce the complexity and dimensionality of the
internal state space. Attention systems must also be defined so that computations are
performed only in those subsets of the state space that are thought to be relevant.
3 Please note that, although the notation is the same, ct refers to c elevated to the power of t, while Rt
refers to R at time index t.
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Finally, elementary motor tasks can be identified and modeled as behaviours, so that
they are not planned completely through each time period.
Example: Koike (2005); Koike et al. (2008) applied this approach in the domain
of autonomous mobile sensorimotor systems. Koike showed how time and space
limits on computations, and limited on-board processing power, could be
accommodated, thanks to simplifying assumptions such as the stationarity of the
temporal models, partial independence between sensory processes, domain-of-
interest selection at the processing stages (attention focusing) and behaviour
selection.
Model: Incorporating such knowledge into models makes them less generic and
more sophisticated. Figure 2 shows the joint distribution of the full model from
Koike.
In Fig. 2, pi refers to the i elementary filters, which are assumed to be
independent (hence all the
QNi
i¼1 products). P(Si
j | Si
j-1 Ai
j-1 pi) are their dynamic
models, P(Oj | Si
j-1 Cj pi) are their sensor models, P(b
j|Bj Si
j Bj-1 pi) are their
behaviour models, P(aj| Cj Si
j Bj pi) are their attention models, and P(k
j | Aj Bj Si
j Aj-1
pi) are their motor command models. Finally, P(A
0 S0 O0 B0 C0 k0b0a0 | p) encodes
the initial state of the system. This model is then used to compute the probability
distribution over the next action to be performed, given the past history of
observation and control variables: P(At | O0:T A0:T-1).
5.5 Discussion
There is no clear definition of a loop. In this section, we have only presented the
definition and examples of temporal loops. These loops can be compared to loops in
the field of computer science, occurring when the execution flow gets several times
through the same set of instructions. Such instructions are specified once for all the
executions of the loop, and the global program is its replication through time.
This replication often occurs with fixed time spans. However, in biological
systems, multiple loops may take place simultaneously with different and
sometimes varying time constants. In robotics, many processes are run concurrently
with different levels of priority. There is a need in Bayesian modeling for a proper
way of integrating and synchronizing loops with different time scales. Finally, loops
can also be considered without reference to time. Bayesian filters are a single model
that is replicated at each time step, with an optional temporal dependency on
preceding time steps. Models have also been proposed for spatial replication of
models, with dependencies occurring over a neighbourhood. One interesting
difference is that temporal relations between instances are oriented according to the
Fig. 2 Joint probability factorization for the full model as designed by Koike
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passage of time, whereas models of spatial loops, such as the Markov Random
Field, rely on a symmetrical relation between neighbours.
6 Conclusion
In this document, we reviewed a number of cognitive issues that both living and
artificial systems have to face. We grouped these issues according to their global
nature, in terms of ambiguities, fusion, hierarchies and loops. For each issue, we
proposed a template Bayesian model, according to its general specification, which
was based on examples from the literature.
These groups of issues correspond to a presentation of the models in terms of
their increasing complexity. It can be noted that, in the beginning of the paper, the
examples are taken mostly from the life sciences, whereas toward the end, they are
taken from computer science and robotics. This last point is not a choice but mirrors
the relative shortage of more complex models in biology. However, the recent
literature shows that Bayesian methodology is gaining momentum in the life
sciences, even if the proposed models are still simpler than those developed in
computer science (Wolpert 2007).
One important reason for this difference is that, contrary to the situation in
robotics, the models presented in the life sciences should be falsifiable. That is, there
must be a way to decide whether the model is false or not. By so doing, the
assumptions underlying the model can be eliminated. In an uncertain environment,
this can be difficult. In the Bayesian formalism, the analogous paradigm is better
replaced by a comparison between models. Various models corresponding to
different assumptions are constructed. Then, their respective probabilities can be
assessed relative to observations using the recognition mechanism. This process
yields a probability distribution over the chosen models, and the final decision for
eliminating models is left to the modeler.
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